As Venezuela enters a post-Maduro phase, a common assumption in Washington is that China and Russia will gradually be pushed out. The logic seems straightforward. With U.S. power reasserted and a new interim leadership in Caracas, foreign rivals should lose leverage. In practice, this view underestimates how deeply both Beijing and Moscow are embedded in Venezuela and misreads how they are likely to adapt.
Neither China nor Russia is preparing for a clean exit. What lies ahead is not withdrawal but adjustment. Both countries are shifting away from confrontation and toward quiet accommodation, focused less on influence and more on protecting hard interests.
China’s position is the most structurally entrenched. Over the past two decades, Beijing has become Venezuela’s largest foreign economic partner, particularly in the oil sector. Chinese state firms such as Sinopec and CNPC hold the largest foreign entitlements to Venezuelan crude, and China has refineries already configured to process it. Beyond energy, Beijing extended roughly $60 billion in official government-to-government loans, with total exposure approaching $100 billion when broader investments are included.
Much of this financing was structured through oil-for-loans deals, with repayment tied directly to crude shipments. While Nicolás Maduro paid down part of this debt before his removal, Venezuela still owes China at least $10 billion and possibly more. The exact figure remains unclear after years of opaque reporting and the disruption caused by U.S. sanctions. What is clear is Beijing’s priority. This is no longer about ideology or geopolitical signaling. It is about debt recovery.
Ironically, U.S. efforts to stabilize Venezuela’s oil sector could help China achieve that goal. President Donald Trump has signaled that oil exports will continue to existing buyers, including China. If U.S. oversight restores production and exports at scale, Beijing may finally recoup part of what it is owed. For China, stability under U.S. dominance is preferable to prolonged chaos that prevents repayment altogether.
China’s footprint in Venezuela also extends beyond oil. Firms such as Huawei and ZTE have been embedded in the country’s telecommunications infrastructure for years. Even a government aligned with Washington would find it difficult to dismantle that presence quickly without major disruption. Beijing understands this leverage and has little incentive to provoke the United States, particularly as Trump seeks to preserve a fragile trade truce with Chinese President Xi Jinping.
Russia’s position is narrower but still resilient. Over more than two decades, Moscow embedded itself deeply in Venezuela’s military and energy sectors. Delcy Rodríguez, Venezuela’s interim leader, has long maintained close ties with Russia. That relationship was publicly affirmed in 2024 when Vladimir Putin awarded her the Order of Friendship.
Energy remains Russia’s primary interest. Billions of dollars are at stake, much of it now held by Roszarubezhneft, a state-owned firm created after U.S. sanctions forced Rosneft to scale back its direct involvement. Moscow has declared these assets Russian state property and signaled its intention to continue operating in Venezuela. This is not rhetorical posturing. It is a calculated effort to preserve legal and commercial continuity as Venezuela’s political order evolves.
Russia has also absorbed the limits of confrontation. Venezuelan air defense systems supplied by Moscow proved ineffective during the U.S. operation that captured Maduro, exposing both technical shortcomings and the reality of U.S. military superiority. That episode showed a clear lesson. Directly challenging Washington over Venezuela is a losing strategy. Expect Russia to keep a low profile, avoid escalation, and focus on asset preservation rather than geopolitical theater.
The emerging outcome is not a dramatic showdown but a form of managed coexistence. China and Russia will operate in a Venezuela increasingly shaped by U.S. pressure, but they will not disappear. Their financial exposure is too deep, their legal claims too substantial, and their incentives too practical.
CHINA IS TOASTING TRUMP’S REPELLENT AFGHANISTAN RHETORIC
Venezuela’s transition may now be influenced primarily by Washington, but it will not be dictated by Washington alone. For Beijing and Moscow, this phase is no longer about expanding influence. It is about limiting losses, protecting investments, and adapting quietly to a U.S.-dominated environment.
Imdat Oner is a former Turkish diplomat who served in Caracas, Venezuela, and I currently work as a senior policy analyst at the Jack D. Gordon Institute for Public Policy. My articles have been published in the War on the Rocks, The National Interest, Americas Quarterly, and Foreign Affairs Latino America.
